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CLOSING STATEMENT 
An “Utterly Implausible” Interpretation of the Constitution 
Seth Barrett Tillman 
When I was in law school, I saw able academics bob and weave, re-
jecting outliers, distinguishing counterauthority, attempting to tie dis-
parate authorities into a coherent whole.  It was very entertaining, and 
I recognize that to do it well requires great intellectual dexterity.  But 
it is a skill that serves a limited purpose.  When divided political insti-
tutions interpret a fixed multi-article document over many years, dis-
parate and rival officials will naturally come to different conclusions as 
to contested meaning.  When predicting how adjudicators will decide 
an unsettled question in the future, one naturally draws on all sources 
of authority.  Legal academics train students to make such predictions 
and to shape decision makers’ decisions.  Bobbing and weaving is a 
necessary skill coextensive with legal practice.  But abstract inquiry 
into original public meaning is substantially different.  Here, bobbing 
and weaving a lot is a strong indication that you do not have a coher-
ent theory, a theory with bottom.  Professor Calabresi’s response—as I 
intend to show—is all bobbing and weaving.  His view is a universe of 
epicycles and unfalsifiable hypotheses.  In choosing between his view 
and my own, the reader should watch for this:  Who is saying the 
Founders were reasonably competent legal draftspersons, and who is 
saying they were unaccountably sloppy?  Who is making exceptionally 
subtle distinctions—the person arguing that disparate language raises 
an inference of disparate meaning or the person arguing that differ-
ent language has identical meaning?  Who puts forward positions that 
are capable of validation and falsification, and who claims that he is 
correct in spite of uncontested presidential, vice presidential, and 
senate practice from 1789 contradicting his position? 
Here, I briefly restate and hopefully clarify my position:  as a tex-
tual matter, the Incompatibility Clause applies to any offices under the 
United States.  My view is that this category does not encompass the 
President and Vice President.  There are two conventions in regard to 
the use of “office” and “officer.”  It is difficult to get people to see this; 
it is something like explaining the meaning of “is” or “the.”  When 
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one is outside a hierarchical relationship, all the persons inside the 
relationship are equally officers.  From the point of view of citizens 
(i.e., “We the People”), the President and his subordinates all equally 
hold office; they are all equally officers.  But for those inside the hier-
archy or describing it, the convention is somewhat different.  In that 
situation, only the subordinates are called officers, and the person or 
persons at the apex of authority are given some other title:  board 
members, trustees, chief magistrates, members of Congress.  The Con-
stitution uses both conventions.  When it varies from one convention 
to the other, it varies its language.  The Succession Clause, for exam-
ple, using “officer” unmodified, makes use of the outside convention.  
The Impeachment Clause (using “Officer of the United States” lan-
guage), the Commissions Clause, the Religious Test Clause, and the 
Incompatibility Clause use the inside view.  When the Incompatibility 
Clause textually precludes members of Congress from being officers 
under the United States, it means that members are precluded from 
taking statutory or appointed office—not from being the President, and 
not from holding elected office at the apex of Executive Branch author-
ity.  See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to Eléonor François Élie, 
Comte de Moustier (May 25, 1789), in 30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE 
WASHINGTON 333, 334 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939) (“The impossi-
bility that one man should be able to perform all the great business of 
State, I take to have been the reason for instituting the great Depart-
ments, and appointing officers therein, to assist the supreme Magistrate 
in discharging the duties of his trust.” (emphasis added)).  “Officers,” 
not “other officers”; “Magistrate,” not “officer”; “trust,” not “office.”  
See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to 
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 637 (1994) (quoting from the same 
passage of the Washington-to-Élie letter); Steven G. Calabresi & Chris-
topher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the First Half-Century, 47 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451, 1475-76 (1997) (same).  Even modern aca-
demics write this way.  Professor Saikrishna Prakash writes that the 
Appointments Clause “establish[es] the requirement of senate con-
firmation for all officers, but permitting Congress, by law, to vest the 
appointment of inferior officers with the President, heads of depart-
ments, and courts.”  Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Deviant Executive 
Lawmaking, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 41 n.224 (1998) (emphasis 
added).  Everyone understands what Prakash and Washington meant; 
in this context, “officers”—yes, even “all officers”—refers to those ap-
pointed by the President, but not to the President.  Thus, notwith-
standing Professor Calabresi’s view that the “any office” language of 
the Incompatibility Clause must refer to the presidency, such lan-
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guage frequently does not include the presidency.  To determine what 
convention was being used in a particular constitutional clause, one 
looks to context, and to what people did when faced with this lan-
guage—which after some 219 years is ambiguous to us, but perhaps 
was not to them. 
Calabresi’s Constitutional Concatenation.  Professor Calabresi and I 
agree that the Incompatibility Clause precludes members of either 
House from holding any office under the United States.  To make out 
his argument that the latter phrase extends to the presidency, he can 
point to no language expressly describing the President as an “officer 
of the United States” or an “officer under the United States,” nor to 
any language describing the presidency as an “office of the United 
States” or an “office under the United States.”  Rather, he points to 
language describing the presidency as an “office,” and he could have 
also pointed to language describing the President as “hold[ing] his 
office.”  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.  As to “under the United 
States,” he argues that that language is implied because the presi-
dency, as all officers created by the Constitution, are under “We the 
People.”  This latter constitutional just-so story makes pleasant read-
ing, but it also makes gibberish of the actual text of the Constitution. 
For example, the Speaker is described as an “officer.”  Does the 
Speaker have an “office”?  The answer is clearly yes:  “‘Officer’ is in-
separably connected with ‘office,’ and there can be no officer without 
an office.”  67 C.J.S. Officers and Public Employees § 1 (2002) (footnotes 
omitted).  (The reverse is not equally true:  it is possible—at times—to 
have or hold office, but not be an officer :  trustees, directors, and those 
at the apex of a chain of legal authority hold office (i.e., Chief Magis-
trates), but they are not at all times and for all purposes officers.)  
Like the President, the Speaker is nowhere described as holding an 
office under the United States, but he is described as an officer of the 
House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States.  If the 
President holds an office under the United States because he holds 
federal office and works for “We the People,” then the Speaker by the 
same reasoning holds an office under the United States too.  On 
Calabresi’s reading, both the Speaker and the President hold an office 
under the United States; i.e., both work for “We the People,” and both 
offices are expressly created by the Constitution.  That reading—
Calabresi’s reading—of the key disputed language within the Incom-
patibility Clause would exclude members of Congress from the presi-
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dency, but it would also equally exclude House members from the 
speakership.  That result is contradicted by uniform Anglo-American 
practice and that indicates that the meaning of “office under the 
United States” cannot be determined by concatenating the separate 
meanings of “office” and “under” and “the United States.”  The alter-
native view is that “office under the United States” is a term of art.  
Professor Calabresi chides me for this position by noting that “office 
under the United States”—unlike the phrase “ex post facto”—does 
not appear in Blackstone or in the English Bill of Rights of 1689.  So 
what?  Even he has acknowledged that “Officer of the United States” is 
a “term of art.”  Steven G. Calabresi, The Political Question of Presidential 
Succession, 48 STAN. L. REV. 155, 161 (1995).  And “officer of the 
United States” does not appear in Blackstone or in the English Bill of 
Rights either (and how could it given the underlying dates involved!).  
If “officer of the United States” can be a term of art, surely so can “of-
fice under the United States.”  Any other result cuts against Calabresi’s 
newly discovered canon against constitutional subtlety. 
The Oaths and Affirmations Clause.  Professor Calabresi affirms that 
“when the Oath Clause of Article VI requires that all federal and state 
executive and judicial officers take oaths to uphold the Constitution the 
Clause is clearly referring to the President, the Vice President and to state 
governors”  (emphasis added).  Not only is that result not clear, it is 
entirely wrong.  See Motions Sys. Corp. v. Bush, 437 F.3d 1356, 1372 
n.9 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Gajarsa, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the en banc judgment) (arguing that the President’s separate Article 
II Oath suggests that the President is “not among the ‘executive offi-
cers’ governed by Article VI, clause 3”).  First, it is because the Arti-
cle VI oath reaches federal executive officers (i.e., officers appointed 
to statutory offices) that the Constitution had to provide the President 
with his own free-standing Article II oath.  Furthermore, the statutory 
oath imposed by the first statute of the first Congress applied to the 
Vice President, but not as an executive branch officer.  Rather, the 
statute compelled the Vice President to take the oath in his role as 
President of the Senate.  Textually, the Oaths Clause applies to sena-
tors and representatives and to federal executive officers, not to the 
President of the Senate, who is neither a member nor senator.  Yet, if 
the Vice President is so clearly a federal executive officer, as Professor 
Calabresi states, then why did the first Congress jump through all 
these unnecessary—if not downright constitutionally suspect—hoops?  
Perhaps they believed that the Vice President was not a federal execu-
tive officer?  Who better understood the Oaths Clause and the Consti-
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tution’s use of office and officer—Professor Calabresi or the first Con-
gress? 
The Impeachment Clause.  The Impeachment Clause applies to “The 
President, Vice President and all civil officers of the United States.”  U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 4 (emphasis added).  Because the word “other” does 
not appear between “all” and “civil,” Justice Story argued that the 
President and Vice President were not officers of the United States.  
Judge Gajarsa and Professor Kalt have arrived at the same conclusion.  
I would argue that the Impeachment Clause is ambiguous.  Faced with 
ambiguous language, I turned to the Convention record.  I pointed 
out that the Clause initially made use of “other,” but it was dropped by 
the Committee of Style, and I concluded by noting that this sequence 
of events is consistent with Story’s position.  Professor Calabresi ac-
cuses me of erring by relying on the “secret legislative history” of the 
Federal Convention.  That is wrong.  My use of legislative history in 
this manner—turning to extrinsic evidence in the face of ambiguous 
text—is standard practice.  See Calabresi & Prakash, The President’s 
Power to Execute the Laws, supra, at 554 (“If the text standing alone 
would have been clear to an ordinary user of the language at the time 
of enactment, one cannot consult the legislative history to that text in 
order to create an ambiguity.”).  Nor did I use the legislative history to 
contradict the text.  Cf. id. (“Legislative history should be used only to 
clarify linguistic ambiguity by shedding light on which of several pos-
sible textual meanings was in fact the one that was ‘intended.’”).  It is 
important for the reader to understand Calabresi’s interpretive ma-
neuver.  If the only person disagreeing with Calabresi were Tillman, 
then he could say the text is clear (i.e., Tillman’s view is idiosyncratic), 
and, therefore, my turn to extrinsic evidence was illegitimate.  But the 
simple truth is, the text is not clear—the fact that Story, Gajarsa, and 
Kalt arrive at a position diametrically opposed to Professor Calabresi’s 
proves at least that much.  Calabresi’s problem is not with my use of 
legislative history, but with Story’s very “wooden” (i.e., Anglo-
American, traditional, eighteenth-century, literalistic) textualism.  
Original public meaning? 
Calabresi’s position is that “other” was dropped as “redundant.”  
That strains credulity.  Why?  In Calabresi’s view, the President and 
Vice President are obviously officers of the United States.  So if the 
drafters dropped “other” because it was redundant, why did they not 
go further (in the interest of avoiding redundancy) and also drop 
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“The President” and “Vice President?”  (Indeed such additional edit-
ing to the Impeachment Clause would have made it textually consis-
tent with the Commissions Clause.)  Furthermore, in his 1995 Stanford 
Law Review article, Professor Calabresi (and a cast of thousands) ar-
gued that “officer” and “officer of the United States” were coextensive 
on the theory that where the Constitution meant to include state offi-
cers, it did so expressly.  So in Calabresi’s view, “the President, Vice 
President, and all other civil officers of the United States” is coextensive 
with “the President, Vice President, and all civil officers of the United 
States” is coextensive with “all civil officers of the United States” is co-
extensive with “all civil officers.”  Yet Calabresi argues that in order to 
avoid redundancy, the Founders just dropped “other.”  So Calabresi’s 
position boils down to this—by dropping “other,” the Founders aimed 
to avoid redundancy, but they were too incompetent to actually 
achieve it. 
The Commissions Clause.  The Commissions Clause mandates that 
the President “shall commission all the officers of the United States.”  
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.  Here the Constitution used exactly the simple 
language the draftspersons failed to use in the Impeachment Clause.  
The Founders did not expressly include the President and Vice Presi-
dent.  Thus, in my childlike simplicity, I conclude this clause excludes 
the President and Vice President.  Professor Calabresi believes other-
wise.  Were Calabresi’s position correct, Presidents and Vice Presi-
dents should have been commissioned since 1789. 
What was the original practice, contemporaneous with ratifica-
tion?  No commissions.  How does Professor Calabresi explain the dis-
crepancy? 
Our practice of not commissioning Presidents and Vice Presidents is 
thus a function of the fact that, like Kings, they take office in a public 
ceremony with elements of coronation, and there is a magic moment 
when the powers of office become invested in them which is when they 
take the oath of office.  There is simply no need for a signed commis-
sion . . . .  Washington’s failure to commission thus looks far more like 
an understandable oversight . . . . 
Oversight?  Vice President Adams presided over the Senate for 
two months and authenticated Congress’s first statute—all prior to 
taking his Article VI oath.  If the “magic moment” of oath taking is an 
obvious substitute for an officer’s commission, then Washington 
should have issued Adams a commission promptly.  Why didn’t Adams 
complain in regard to its absence?  Why is there no record of any 
(anti-administration or anti-Adams) Senator—or anyone else in the 
United States—lodging a complaint about Washington’s oversight?  Is 
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it not far more reasonable to suggest that everyone believed that 
Presidents and Vice Presidents do not fall under the aegis of the 
Commissions Clause, and that Washington, Adams, and the first Sen-
ate acted correctly, but it is Professor Calabresi’s analysis which errs?  
First Justice Story, now Washington and Adams.  Exactly how much 
constitutional text and how many Founders will Professor Calabresi 
throw under the bus to accommodate his position?  How is it that he is 
so right, and they are all so wrong? 
Moreover, I really wonder how many PENNumbra readers will un-
derstand what sort of intellectual climbdown has taken place here.  
Professor Calabresi has argued in numerous scholarly articles that the 
Constitution’s use of “shall” (i.e., the verb in the Commissions Clause) 
is mandatory language and that the precedents of Washington’s ad-
ministration are constitutionally sound precedents, exemplars of the 
original public meaning of constitutional text.  Mandatory does not 
mean it is okey-dokey to skip obeying the command if you believe (in 
this case wrongly) on functional grounds that no purpose will be 
served by obedience to the text.  But if the Washington-
administration-era precedents are so unsound, if Calabresi is right and 
Washington was wrong, then what—if anything—is left of Professor 
Calabresi’s unitary executive thesis? 
Space considerations leave me unable to address the remainder of 
Professor Calabresi’s interesting counterarguments.  I sum up by not-
ing that I have argued that the President is neither an officer of the 
United States nor an officer under the United States.  If these two re-
lated claims are correct, then the Incompatibility Clause does not ap-
ply to the President.  Professor Calabresi is sure I am wrong; he chides 
me for attempting to interpret the placement of the word “govern-
ment” in the Sweeping Clause, the only clause discussing officers mak-
ing use of the phrase “Government of the United States.”  Am I the 
first to attempt to interpret obscure language?  Compare Calabresi & 
Prakash, The President’s Power, supra, at 567 (finding “no significance . . . 
[in the] slight variations in wording between [the Article I and Arti-
cle III] clauses that vest Congress with the power to create inferior 
courts to the Supreme Court” (emphasis added)), with Steven G. 
Calabresi & Gary S. Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, 
and the Hamdan Opinions:  A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 
COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1028-29 (2007) (distinguishing the same two 
clauses, and arguing that the Article I Tribunals Clause, unlike its Ar-
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ticle III counterpart, permits Congress to designate state courts infe-
rior to the Supreme Court).  He describes my (a/k/a Story’s) position 
as “utterly implausible,” by which he means, it was (prior to reading 
my paper) unknown to him and to his modern academic colleagues.  
But Professor Calabresi’s position was unknown to John Adams and to 
his eighteenth-century Senate colleagues.  To paraphrase the greatest 
constitutional scholar to hail from Illinois (himself relying on other, 
older Authority), better a live dog, than a dead lion. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
A Term of Art or the Artful Reading of Terms? 
Steven G. Calabresi 
Seth Barrett Tillman’s rebuttal claims that when the Incompatibil-
ity Clause says that “no Person holding any Office under the United 
States, shall be a Member of either House” of Congress it does not ap-
ply to the President.  Tillman’s position is that Presidents can serve 
simultaneously as members of Congress even though in eight hun-
dred years of English and American history no King, Queen, colonial 
governor, or President has ever served simultaneously in the legisla-
ture.  Tillman concedes that the word “any” as used in the Incompati-
bility Clause means “any,” that the presidency is an “office” as that 
term is used in the Clause, and that the Necessary and Proper Clause 
uses the words “officer” of “the Government of the United States” to 
describe the President, but he persists in denying that the presidency 
is an “office under the United States.”  He argues that the phrase “of-
fice under the United States” is a term of art, like the phrase “officer 
of the United States,” and that Justice Joseph Story was right when he 
said many years after the founding that the President was not an offi-
cer of the United States. 
Tillman’s argument is too subtle by half.  The questions a consti-
tutional interpreter must answer are:  first, what was the widely held 
original public meaning of the words in question; second, how have 
those words been understood over the course of our history; and 
third, what reading of the language leads to the most normatively 
plausible and thus, most likely, the intended result.  Of these ques-
tions, by far the most important is the first. 
The original public meaning of the constitutional text is the start-
ing point for constitutional analysis because it was the voters in the 
thirteen original states who elected the ratifying conventions who had 
the authority to make the Constitution law.  Voters and members of 
the ratifying conventions read the framers’ Constitution, and it was 
their shared public understanding of what the Constitution meant 
that led to its becoming law.  Original meaning is thus about what the 
ordinary citizen on the street would have thought words meant.  It is 
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not about the understanding of someone as erudite as Justice Story.  It 
must be presumed that ordinary citizens would have given words like 
“any,” “office,” or “officer” of “the government of the United States” 
their commonsense meaning of including the President of the United 
States.  It is highly unlikely that the American people in the 1780s 
would have understood the phrase “office under the United States” to 
be a specialized term of art that did not include the President not-
withstanding the plain public meaning of all of these other words.  
This is especially the case because for Tillman to be right, the Ameri-
can people would have to have thought that Presidents could serve 
simultaneously as members of Congress even though no King, Queen, 
or colonial governor has ever, to my knowledge, served simultaneously 
as a member of the legislature. 
Tillman claims the President, unlike the Chief Justice or Associate 
Justices of the Supreme Court, is not an officer “under the United 
States,” because the framers thought of him and sometimes described 
him in private correspondence as our “Chief Magistrate.”  Tillman 
thus postulates that the President has a different status from the jus-
tices of the Supreme Court such that the presidential office is not an 
“office under the United States.”  Forgive me, but this argument 
smacks of the claim that the President is a monarch, while it ignores 
the fact that even monarchs could not serve simultaneously in the leg-
islature.  The Constitution repeatedly refers to the presidency as an 
“office,” and it describes him as an “officer” of the “Government of 
the United States.”  Nowhere, however, does the Constitution call the 
President a “Chief Magistrate” or a “trustee.”  The framers may or may 
not have thought of him that way, but what counts in constitutional 
law is what they said in the text and not what they thought.  They said 
he held an office and that he was an officer of the Government of the 
United States and that is all we need to know to settle this matter. 
Tillman notes that the Constitution did describe the Speaker of 
the House as an officer, and yet the Incompatibility Clause has never 
been thought to preclude members of Congress from serving as 
Speakers, committee chairs, or legislative officers.  That is true, but 
the Constitution specifically says the House and Senate shall “chuse” 
“the Speaker and their other officers.”  Speakers and Committee Chairs 
are thus not officers of the United States but are only officers of the 
House of Representatives or the Senate.  Surely Tillman would not 
confound the United States with the House or the Senate!  Moreover, 
the fact is that there was a long tradition in 1787 of members of Par-
liament serving simultaneously as Speaker, while there was no tradi-
tion at all of members of Parliament simultaneously being Monarchs.  
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Such traditions counsel in favor of reading the phrase “office under 
the United States” as including the President while excluding officers 
who are officers only of the House or of the Senate. 
Tillman objects that the President is not an “officer of the United 
States” for purposes of the Appointments, Impeachments, or Commis-
sions Clauses, and he therefore claims he cannot be said to hold “any 
Office under the United States.”  Both phrases according to Tillman 
must be synonymous.  To begin with, this simply is not true.  The 
phrase “any Office under the United States” is potentially broader 
than the phrase “officer of the United States” both because it uses the 
word “any” and because the word “under” could be broader than “of.” 
Moreover, most readers of ordinary English in 1787 would likely 
have thought that the phrase “officer” of the “Government of the 
United States” in the Necessary and Proper Clause and the phrase “of-
ficer of the United States” in the Appointment Clause meant the same 
thing.  The phrases are simply too similar to permit different mean-
ings, and Tillman provides no evidence whatsoever of such different 
meanings.  Ordinary speakers of English might have thought the 
President was an officer whose appointment was “herein otherwise 
provided for” because he is selected by the Electoral College and be-
cause the word “herein” refers to the rest of the whole Constitution 
here as it obviously does in the Vesting Clause of Article I.  See U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be 
vested in a Congress of the United States . . . .”).  Tillman’s inability to 
differentiate the Necessary and Proper Clause is thus fatal to his thesis.  
Congress has enacted lots of legislation over two centuries predicated 
on the idea that it can carry into execution the President’s executive 
power because he is an “officer” of “the Government of the United 
States.” 
This brings us back to the Impeachment Clause which says that 
“[t]he President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United 
States” are liable to removal by impeachment.  Tillman claims it is 
portentous that this clause lists the President and Vice President sepa-
rately from “all civil officers of the United States,” and he notes that 
the word “other” appeared between “all” and “civil” in early drafts of 
the Constitution and was deliberately omitted from the final text.  
With all due respect, Tillman here has made a mountain out of a 
molehill.  The reason the Impeachment Clause separately refers to 
the President and the Vice President is not because the framers did 
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not think they were civil officers of the United States, but is rather be-
cause the framers wanted to be clear that Presidents and Vice Presi-
dents, unlike Kings and Queens, were impeachable.  In England, this 
had not been the case, and since the framers were departing here 
from the English practice, they thought they needed to be especially 
clear about what they were doing lest they be misunderstood. 
The omission of the word “other” in the Constitution’s secret 
drafting history counts for nothing to original-meaning textualists and 
in any event is explained on the ground that use of the word here was 
redundant.  The lesson of the Impeachment Clause is that when the 
framers departed from English practice, they were really clear that 
that was what they were doing.  This point obviously harms Tillman’s 
thesis since there was no English practice of Kings or Queens serving 
as members of Parliament.  Moreover, the Impeachment Clause reaf-
firms that the President and Vice President are civil officers “under” 
and not “over” the United States because, unlike Kings and Queens, 
they are impeachable.  The Clause thus hurts Tillman’s case more 
than it helps it. 
That leaves us with Tillman’s argument about the Commissions 
Clause, where, as I conceded in my Opening Statement, he has a valid 
point.  The Commissions Clause commands that the President must 
commission all the officers of the United States, and yet no President 
has commissioned himself, his successor, or his Vice President.  Thus, 
Tillman has an argument from practice that Presidents and Vice Presi-
dents either have not been regarded as being officers of the United 
States or at least that the question has been embarrassingly over-
looked. 
Several points deserve recognition in response here.  First, even if 
Tillman were right that Presidents and Vice Presidents were not “offi-
cers of the United States” it would not necessarily follow that the 
presidency is not included by the different words “any Office under 
the United States.”  The latter phrase again is arguably broader than is 
the former.  “Any office” means any office, and the Constitution is as 
plain as day when it says that the presidency is an office, as Tillman 
himself concedes. 
Moreover, Tillman’s argument about practice under the Commis-
sions Clause runs smack into a counterargument about practice under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause whereby Congress has treated the 
President as if he is an “officer” of the “Government of the United 
States” in many statutes, including the Impoundment Control Act and 
the War Powers Resolution.  It is obvious that individuals and busi-
nesses have relied far more on the practice under the Necessary and 
158 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 134 
PENNumbra 
 
 
Proper Clause than they have on the clerical practice under the 
Commissions Clause.  Thus, if it is practice since the framing that 
counts in constitutional law, I win hands down. 
Tillman, however, seems to think Washington’s practice of not 
commissioning himself, his successor, or his Vice President is some 
kind of postenactment legislative history that suggests Washington 
made a considered judgment that Presidents were really more like 
Kings and Queens than they were holders of “any Office under the 
United States.”  There is no evidence, however, that Washington ever 
thought about the matter one way or the other or that even if he did, 
he interpreted the Commissions Clause correctly.  Washington was fal-
lible and made plenty of mistakes, and this was one of them. 
Arguments from the original meaning of the constitutional text 
and from two centuries of American practice and eight hundred years 
of English practice suggest that there is no support for dual presiden-
tial and congressional office-holding.  These arguments are bolstered 
by normative concerns.  There is an obvious conflict of interest when 
a President claims simultaneously to represent the whole nation and 
the people of Illinois.  To put it mildly, the national interest may often 
conflict with the interests of voters in a particular state or congres-
sional district.  A President who is also a representative or a senator 
will be paid in part to represent a congressional district or a state and 
that may influence him in serving the nation as a whole.  If it does not 
influence him, then he might give short shrift to the interests of the 
state or district he is representing.  The conflict of interest created by 
dual presidential and congressional office-holding might be tolerable 
if the Constitution clearly commanded it, but the reality is the oppo-
site.  Faced with such a situation, a constitutional interpreter is enti-
tled to presume that the framers meant to do the right thing, norma-
tively, rather than that they meant to create a bizarre conflict of 
interest—a conflict of interest unprecedented in the last eight hun-
dred years. 
There is one strong argument for Tillman’s position which he 
does not make, and that is an argument from the original intentions 
of the framers rather than from the original public meaning of the 
text they wrote.  The framers intended the Incompatibility Clause to 
prevent Presidents from bribing members of Congress by offering 
them lucrative public offices.  They may very well have never thought 
about the possibility of the clause applying to the President himself.  
2008] The Great Divorce 159 
All of this is true, but it is utterly beside the point, because what mat-
ters is not what the framers intended, but what was the original public 
meaning of the text that they wrote and the people ratified.  The text 
forbids members of Congress from holding “any Office under the 
United States.”  The presidency is plainly such an office.  And that is 
the beginning and the end of constitutional inquiry. 
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